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CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
BABY M DECISION

BARBARA STARK*

INTRODUCTION
Despite the exhaustive coverage of the Baby M case,1 there
has been relatively little discussion of the difficult constitutional
questions posed by that case. 2 Judge Harvey Sorkow, the trial
court judge, held that the surrogacy contract was constitutionally
protected as an exercise of the parties' "procreation" rights. 3 His
* Barbara Stark is a Staff Attorney and the Acting Administrative Director of the
Constitutional Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law School. The author would like to thank
Jonathan Hyman and Nadine Taub for being so generous with their time and insight. The
research assistance of Diane Cassitta, Patrick Malone, and Barbara Newmeyer is also
gratefully acknowledged.
I In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313 (Ch. Div.), 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), rev'd, No. A-39
(N.J. Feb. 3, 1988) (available Feb. 15, 1988 on LEXIS, States library, NJ file, as "1988
N.J. Lexis 1") (The court specifically enforced a surrogacy contract entered into by
William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead. Mrs. Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated with Mr. Stem's sperm, carry the child to term, terminate her parental rights, and
surrender the child. The court found provisions of the contract preventing Mrs. Whitehead
from having an abortion unconstitutional, while holding that Mrs. Whitehead breached
the contract by not surrendering the child and giving up her parental rights. The court
further determined that it was in the best interests of the child to enforce the agreement.).
2 See generally Kaufman, Judges or Scholars: To Whom Shall We Look for Our ConstitutionalLaw? 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 187-97 (1987). Kaufman argues that "the openended provisions of the fourteenth amendment.... present the problem of constitutional
interpretation in its most difficult form.... For better or worse the course of history has
brought us to the 1980s with the judiciary in possession of the obligation to interpret the
fourteenth amendment." Id. at 197. But cf. Comment, Parenthood by Proxy: Legal
Implications of SurrogateBirth, 67 IowA L. REv. 385, 386 (1982) [hereinafter Parenthood
by Proxy] (questioning whether a constitutional analysis can provide adequate guidance
as to the pragmatic concerns inherent in the surrogacy relationship such as support,
visitation, and custody, which are better addressed by family law).
1217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164. As this article was going to press, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reached its decision to reverse the lower court decision in the
Baby M case. In re Baby M, No. A-39 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988) (available Feb. 15, 1988, on
LEXIS, States library, NJ file, as "1988 N.J. Lexis 1"). The New Jersey Supreme Court
did not decide the case on constitutional grounds. In dicta, the court did find that the
constitutionally protected right to procreate asserted by Mr. Stern did not encompass the
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constitutional analysis of the Baby M case failed, however, because Sorkow mistakenly assumed that surrogacy is a single
event, rather than a relationship which changes over time.
The procreation right which the trial court identified is not
broad enough to encompass all aspects of the multi-faceted surrogacy relationship. Moreover, the trial court never reached the
critical question of the alienability of the several different rights
actually involved here. 4 This article suggests an alternative approach to the crucial constitutional questions raised in Baby M,
an approach which addresses the issue of alienability in the sur5
rogacy context.
Although the surrogacy agreement in Baby M raises novel legal
issues, no dearth of constitutional interpretation exists with respect to the components of the surrogacy agreement, such as its
right to raise the child or to destroy Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights; and because the
case was decided on other grounds it was not necessary for the court to decide if Mr.
Stem's rights to the "custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow birth" were
constitutionally protected fundamental rights, "when opposed by the claim of the mother
to the same child." Likewise, although the court noted that the natural mother's claim to
"the right to the companionship of her child" was recognized as a fundamental right, the
issue was moot since the case was decided in her favor. Since the New Jersey Supreme
Court's constitutional discussion is not fully developed, the critique of Judge Sorkow's
constitutional analysis is given as a counterbalance to the alternative constitutional formulation the author proposes.
4 Alienation is a present promise to waive a right in the future. Alienation of rights is
distinguishable from waiver in that waiver occurs only at the time one may invoke a
vested right. See generally Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 936 (1985) (defining alienable rights as those which can
be sold or transferred and inalienable rights as those which cannot be transferred or given
away, using voting as an example of an inalienable right; neither kind of right need be
exercised in order to be retained).
5 As used in this paper, "surrogacy" refers only to agreements between biological
parents. It does not include other types of agreements-the implantation of a fertilized
egg in the surrogate, for example-which may well raise issues not considered here. In
addition, this article will not discuss the myriad rights and obligations arising under the
common law or the various statutes applicable in this case. A discussion of Judge
Sorkow's determination with respect to payment for Whitehead's services, for example,
is beyond the scope of this article since this was decided on common law contract
principles. See generally Coleman, SurrogateMotherhood:Analysis of the Problems and
Suggestionsfor Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REa. 71, 77 (1982); Radin, Market-Inalienability,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1933 (1987); Parenthoodby Proxy, supra note 2, at 389 n.32.
A full discussion of the societal implications of the new reproductive technology is also
beyond the scope of this article. See generally Widler, Society's Response to the New
Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. R-v. 1043, 1044
(1986); L. Andrews, "Feminist Perspectives on Reproductive Technologies," a paper
presented at a Forum on Reproductive Laws for the 1990s, in New York City (May 4,
1987) (on file at the Harvard Women's Law Journal).
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provisions regarding abortion 6 and termination of parental rights. 7
The basic underlying issues here have similarly been addressed
by the courts in cases involving contracts, 8 procreation, 9 and
adoption. 10 While the surrogacy relationship in its entirety may
be qualitatively different from the sum of its parts, a full under-

standing of the precedents addressing artificial insemination,
pregnancy and abortion, and determination of parental rights is

essential in developing a constitutional analysis."
The article will be in two parts. The first section will discuss
the problems raised, and the questions left open, by Judge
Sorkow's inchoate formulation of the parties' "procreation"
rights. 12 The second section suggests an alternative formulation
6 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (striking Texas criminal abortion statutes
prohibiting abortion at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother as
violative of constitutional right of privacy). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210
(1973) (requirements of Georgia statute that hospital committee approve proposed abortion lacks constitutional pertinence and requirement that two licensed physicians confirm
recommendation ofpregnant woman's consultant has no rational connection with patient's
needs).
7 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (failure to give the putative father notice
of pending adoption did not deny him due process where he never established any
relationship with the child); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (where father
establishes substantial relationship with child, statute permitting adoption of child without
consent of unwed father violates Equal Protection Clause); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978) (equal protection principles did not require that an unwed father, who never
legitimatized child, be given the same authority to veto adoption as a divorced father);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (due process required that an unwed father be
granted a hearing as to his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken from him
after the death of their natural mother).
8 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934) (holding that
"[t]he question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or
directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end").
9See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (law authorizing sterilization of person
convicted more than twice of felonies involving "moral turpitude" held violative of equal
protection); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding sterilization law applicable to
mentally defective inmates in state institution).
10 See supra note 7.
,Cf. Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 291, 306 n.65 (1982); Note, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal
Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RiCH. L. REv. 467, 468, 481 (1982) [hereinafter
Surrogate Mother Agreements] (discussing inadequacies of analyzing the various components of the surrogacy process rather than the process as a whole, and raising the
provocative point that surrogacy may define the outer limits of the flexibility of the
privacy concept developed in Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and its progeny).
I2 In fairness, Judge Sorkow did not have much guidance. See Note, Roe and Paris:
Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1974) [hereinafter Right
of Privacy] ("One of the major failings of the Court has been its treatment of privacy as
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in which the particular privacy rights involved in the surrogacy
process are identified as the decisional right with respect to one's
own reproductive capacity and the right to bodily integrity."
Moreover, it is argued that the development of the parents' liberty

interest in their child must be taken into account. Using the
revised formulation, the second section presents an analysis of
the parties' rights at each discrete stage of the complex surrogacy

relationship: (1) the agreement, (2) insemination and conception,
(3) pregnancy and abortion, and (4) determination of parental
rights. 14
This article will develop the proposition that because of the
nature of the rights involved in the surrogacy relationship, the
parties-particularly the surrogate mother-cannot constitutionally alienate and deprive their future selves of these rights.1 5 The
a self-explanatory, unitary concept, when in fact one or more of a number of distinct
meanings may lie behind a claim to privacy protection."). See also Dixon, The Griswold
Penumbra: ConstitutionalCharterfor an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REV.
197, 199-200 (1965) ("Few concepts, however, are more vague or less amenable to
definition and structured treatment than privacy.... The term [right of privacy] nowhere
appears in the Constitution, but is quite obviously a background interest underlying the
specific guarantees of the third, fourth and fifth amendments."); Sutherland, Privacy in
Connecticut, 64 MICH. L. REv.283, 287-88 (1965) (noting that the privacy right has been
found by the Court in the Fourteenth Amendment's "latent" due process guarantees and
that at some point a subjective value judgment must be made that the Court is probably
the best ultimate arbiter). Cf. Right of Privacy, supra at 1174 ("[T]oo broad a definition
might actually be counterproductive to the effective protection of privacy interests. A
broad but vague concept might prove less vigorous than a narrow but more clearly defined
one.").
13These two rights have been identified by the Supreme Court as well as described by
commentators. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1306-07, 1329-61 (2d ed. 1988).
,4For a general discussion of the issues arising at each of these stages, see generally
PartI: The Law of Abortion, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1568 (1979): Regan, Rewriting Roe v.
Wade, at 1569; King, The JuridicalStatus of the Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection
of rhe Unborn, at 1647; Appleton, The Abortion Funding Cases and Population Control:
An Imaginary Lawsuit (and Some Reflections on the Uncertain Limits of Reproductive
Privacy), at 1688; Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, at
1724; Part Il The Politics of Abortion, at 1749. See also Hollinger, From Coitus to
Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 865 (1985); Isaacs & Holt, Redefining Procreation:Facingthe Issues (Sept.
1987) (Vol. 42, No. 3, Population Bulletin) (on file at the Harvard Women's Law Journal);
Johnson, The Baby M Decision: Specific Performance of a Contractfor Specially Manufactured Goods, I1 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1339 (1987); Lister, The Right to Control the Use of
One's Body, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 348 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971); Privacy Symposium, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 251-435 (1966); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
11It should be noted that this article focuses on the substance of the right; that is, the
content of the agreement rather than any presumption that the promisor's reasoning
ability is in some way defective. See Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts,
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article concludes that the alienation of rights under the terms of
the Baby M surrogacy agreement was unconstitutional. 16 It is
further argued that the line of Supreme Court cases which have

addressed the issues raised here, including the cases cited by
Judge Sorkow, require (1) that either party be permitted to with-

draw from the surrogacy relationship before conception, (2) that
the court recognize the woman's exclusive right to control her
body during the pregnancy and (3) that there be a post-birth
voluntary surrender by the surrogate mother. In the absence of
such surrender, parental rights cannot be terminated without due

process. 17 Therefore, courts cannot enforce a demand for specific
performance of essential provisions of the surrogacy contract
without violating the parties' constitutional rights.

I. SURROGACY AND PROCREATION RIGHTS: THE
TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS

State legislatures would ordinarily have the power to ban surrogacy agreements as long as such a ban would not violate the
constitutional rights of the surrogate mother and/or the biological
92 YALE L.J. 763, 786 (1983) (distinguishing prohibitions against self-enslavement, which
bar certain agreements regardless of their particular terms or the circumstances under
which they were entered, and restrictions concerned with the promisor's reasoning ability,
such as the rule against enforcing a child's contract against him). There is no implicit
assumption that women, or pregnant women, are incapable or less than fully competent
to make these decisions for themselves at the time they act upon those decisions.
The formulation of a comprehensive theory of rights to explain what it is about the
substance of these rights that renders them inalienable is beyond the scope of this paper.
It will be assumed for my purposes that these rights are as crucial to "personhood," see
Radin, supra note 5, at 1879-87, or "integrity or self-respect," see Kronman supra, at
778-79, as any fixed in the Griswold v. Connecticut penumbra, see Griswold, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). See also infra note 56.
,6Cf. Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The InalienableRights of Surrogate Mothers,
99 HARV. L. Rv. 1936, 1941 (1986) [hereinafter Inalienable Rights] (asserting that constitutional doctrines developed in connection with the Thirteenth Amendment and the
Roe v. Wade privacy right "offer no determinate answers to questions of alienability").
17 See infra notes 152-153, 157. Under New Jersey law, the power to terminate parental
rights is reserved to the state and expressly limited by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:218-9:2-20 (West 1987). If the surrogate's parental rights are not terminated, there must
be a judicial determination of custody.
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father.18 However, if it can be shown that surrogacy involves
fundamental constitutional rights, the state would have to establish a compelling interest to justify any restriction. 19 Although
there was no legislation at issue in the Baby M case, Judge
Sorkow properly noted that "[tjhis court's inquiry constitutes
state action. ' 20 By finding that fundamental rights were at stake,
Judge Sorkow triggered the more stringent standard. 21
Judge Sorkow's constitutional analysis focused on the line of
cases including Meyer v. Nebraska,2z Skinner v. Oklahoma, 23
Stanley v. Illinois,24 Reed v. Reed,25 Griswold v. Connecticut,26

and Eisenstadt v. Baird.27 Tracing a fundamental right to "marry,
establish a home, and bring up children,"' 28 to Meyer v. Nebraska,
the Judge proceeded to cite Skinner v. Oklahoma for the propo-

sition that the right to procreate is among the "basic civil rights
of man,"'' 9 and Stanley v. Illinois and Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur0 to establish that these rights are "far more
18Legislation regulating social and economic matters, including regulation of contracts,
is subject to a rationality test. In order to be upheld as constitutional, socioeconomic
regulation must merely be rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
supra note 13, at 581-84.
As of July 1987, no state legislature had yet banned surrogacy. Surrogate Parenthood:
Legislative Update, 13 Fam.L. Rep. (BNA) 1442 (July 14, 1987). But see States Assess
Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, at 42, col. 1 (noting that since the
trial court's decision in Baby M, 70 bills seeking to ban, regulate, or study surrogacy
have been introduced and Louisiana has approved legislation declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable).
19 Legislation restricting fundamental rights is subject to a two-tiered strict scrutiny
test. As set forth in Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977), the test
requires: (1) a compelling state interest in regulating the activity and (2) a restriction
which is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest. See also Note, Special
Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy and Birth, 39
VAND. L. REV.597, 653 & n.275 (1986) [hereinafter Conception, Pregnancy and Birth]
(noting that since privacy and procreation rights are fundamental rights, restrictive regulations must meet the Carey test in order to be constitutional); Right of Privacy, supra
note 12, at 1167 ("Historically, the state has rarely lost under the rational relation test
and has rarely prevailed under the compelling state interest test.").
20217 N.J. Super. at 387, 525 A.2d at 1165.
21 217 N.J. Super. at 384-88, 525 A.2d at 1164-66.
- 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
- 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
- 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
28Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
29 217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
30Cleveland, 414 U.S. 632 (1973).
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than property rights" 31 and that "freedom of per-

sonal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
liberties protected
32
Amendment.
Without providing a full analysis of these cases, the trial court
suggested that surrogacy involves a fundamental "right to procreate": 33 "If one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has
the right to reproduce non-coitally. If it is the reproduction that
is protected, then the means of reproduction are also to be protected. ' 34 Although most commentators who have found a right
to engage in surrogacy relationships have similarly grounded it
in these cases, 35 the privacy rights which they establish are far
from clear.
The constitutional basis, if any, for the privacy rights dealing
with sex, marriage, and the family remains the subject of raging
debate. 36 Each new case seeking to extend these rights has in-

spired a renewed onslaught. 37 A more probing doctrinal analysis
31Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651
(quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953))).
32217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164 (citing Cleveland, 414 U.S. at 639-40).
33217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164.
3 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Cleveland, 414 U.S. at 639-40).
3-See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 5, at 75-76, 118 (questioning the extension of the
privacy right to the surrogacy context and suggesting that such extension is logical); Note,
Baby-Sitting Consideration:Surrogate Mother's Right to 'Rent Her Womb' For a Fee,
18 GoNz. L. REv. 539, 553 (1982) [hereinafter Baby-Sitting Consideration] (discussing
development of expansive approach to fundamental right of privacy by the Supreme
Court and the revival of substantive due process as applied to surrogacy). See also
Graham, supra note 11, at 308-15 (arguing that the protective structures espoused in
Skinner and Griswold were related to the preservation of a system of patriarchal family
structure and authority; "[n]either [case] emphasized the particular impact upon women
and children of the unavailability of choice," id. at 308); Note, Reproductive Technology
and the ProcreationRights of the Unmarried,98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985) [hereinafter
ProcreationRights of the Unmarried] (arguing that the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments encompass a right to procreate).
6 See, e.g., Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); McKay, The Right
of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1965); Monaghan, Our
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 353, 365-67 & n.81 (1981).
37As the majority noted in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986)
(White, J.):

Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than the imposition of the
Justices' own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government, the
Court has sought to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened
judicial protection. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S. Ct. 149,
151, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), it was said that this category includes those funda-

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. I11

than that set forth by Judge Sorkow is necessary to ascertain the
extent to which the privacy rights recognized in the cases to date
offer an approach to surrogacy.
While noting that the cited cases address "family" rights, 38 the
trial court skimmed over the limitations of their holdings. Skinner, for example, involved a challenge to a law authorizing the
sterilization of persons convicted more than twice of "felonies
involving moral turpitude. ' 39 The Skinner Court stressed the irrevocable impact, for society as well as the individual, of the
statute in dispute. "The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have
subtle, far reaching, and devastating effects. In evil or reckless
hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for
the individual whom the law touches. 40
The "basic civil right" 41 established in Skinner was the "right
to have offspring.

' 42

The plaintiff was protected only from an

affirmative act of the state which would irredeemably deprive
him of that right-an act, moreover, that involved an invasive
physical procedure. A ban on surrogacy would not prevent either
party in the Baby M case from physically engendering children.
It would simply preclude the agreed upon arrangements regarding
legal parentage, an issue which did not concern the Skinner
Court.
Skinner, in the surrogacy context, may more aptly be relied on
for the proposition that individuals should be free from state
interference with respect to control over their own bodies for
mental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed." A different
description of fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1937, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.), where
they are characterized as those liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." Id. at 503, 97 S. Ct. at 1938 (Powell, J.). See also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 506, 85 S. Ct. at 1693.
38 Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164. Cf. Gerety, Redefining Privacy,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 270 n.133 (discussing limitations of the concept of
"familial" privacy).
39Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537.
4 Id. at 541. See generally Note, Validity of Oklahoma Statute Involving Sterilization
of Criminals, 22 B.U.L. REV. 590 (1942); Note, Constitutionalityof Sterilization Statutes,
27 MARQ. L. REV. 99 (1943); Note, Compulsory Sterilization Statute, 41 MICH. L. REV.
318 (1942); Note, Constitutionality of State Laws Providing Sterilization for Habitual
Criminals, 51 YALE L.J. 1380 (1942).
4' Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
42
Id. at 536.

Baby M.
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reproductive purposes. 43 The trial court, however, did not make
this point.
The trial court's analysis of Stanley v. Illinois was similiarly
inadequate. The Stanley Court protected an intact, functioning
family unit in which the father, albeit unwed, had lived with and
supported his minor children for several years. Upon the death
of their natural mother, the children became wards of the state
under Illinois law.4 Under these circumstances, the Court held
that "Stanley's interest in retaining custody of his children is
cognizable and substantial" 45 and that the children could not be
removed from his custody without a hearing.
The Stanley decision created no affirmative right to begin a
family outside of marriage, which was precisely the point of the
surrogacy arrangement. Rather, the parental rights recognized in
Stanley arose from substantial parental responsibilities assumed
years before the protection of family status was sought. As the
Court noted: "The private interest here, that of a man in the
children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
'46
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.
Judge Sorkow's reliance on Reed v. Reed is also troublesome. 47
The trial court held that surrogate mothers, like "surrogate father" sperm donors, should be recognized by the law. 48 Judge
Sorkow explained that "[i]f a man may offer the means for procreation then a woman must equally be allowed to do so. To rule
otherwise denies equal protection of the law to the childless
couple, the surrogate, whether male or female, and the unborn
child. "49
Reed only required that similarly situated persons be treated
alike. A classification based on gender, according to the Reed
43As other commentators have noted, Skinner recognized "the fundamental character
of the reproductive decision." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
13, at 1339.
44Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
41 Id. at 652.
4Id.

47404

at 651.

U.S. 71, 76 (Court determined that state law giving men preference over women
in appointment as executors of estates was discriminatory and violative of the Equal
Protection Clause).
41Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1165. Cf. Radin, supra note 5, at 1932
n.285 (noting that the situations of sperm donors and surrogate mothers are "asymmetrical
because the carrying of the child in the woman's body (whether or not it is hers genetically)
is a stronger factor in interrelationships with a child than an abstract genetic relationship").
49 Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1165.
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Court, "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 50 A persuasive argument may
be made that a surrogate mother and a sperm donor are not
similarly situated. There is no male analogue to gestation, labor
and birth. A sperm donor is at most comparable to an ovum
donor. 51 In fact, given the present state of technology, which
requires a far more intrusive procedure to obtain an egg than to
obtain sperm, there may be no comparison at all.
Moreover, classifications based on gender are merely quasisuspect, and therefore, not subject to strict scrutiny. These classifications do not violate equal protection as long as they are
52
substantially related to an important governmental objective.
Under this standard the avoidance of the undeniably greater
health risk assumed by the surrogate mother could well be considered such an important governmental objective.
There are more persuasive arguments for the right of the parties3
5
in the surrogacy relationship to utilize artificial insemination,
including the arguments advanced by Judge Sorkow regarding
the right to engender a child. 54 The parties exercise their rights
to make decisions regarding their reproductive capacity when
they utilize artificial insemination, for biological engendering is
all that is involved in the insemination process. The right to
engage in artificial insemination may also be seen as an aspect of
the fundamental right of each party to control his or her own
body. 55
50Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)). "The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state
objective ... "Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.

51See Donating Parenthood:Clinic Opens First Egg Depositoryfor Infertile Couples,

Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), July 15, 1987, at 9, col. I (discussing procedure for ovum
donation which includes surgical removal of the egg from the donor).
' See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
53See Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call
for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HAgv. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 29-40 (1981) (arguing
that none of the state interests which could be advanced to forbid artificial insemination,
including an economic interest in limiting number of welfare recipients, protection of the
child, and promotion of traditional family units are sufficiently compelling to justify
restrictive legislation).
54
See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
5-See generally Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S.CAL. L. Rv.942, 963 (1986).
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Judge Sorkow relied on Griswold56 for the proposition that
"individuals ha[ve] a right of privacy entitled to constitutional
protection,"57 but there is no effort to define the privacy right
protected in Griswold or to show how the right might apply in
the surrogacy context. 5 The Griswold Court found that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance,"5 9 and that a marital right of privacy was created by the
'
penumbras of "several fundamental constitutional guarantees . 60
The Supreme Court's "privacy" formulations in Griswold are
ambiguous and a clear standard has yet to be articulated. The
trial court did not grapple with the complexities of that decision.
Nor did the court acknowledge the considerable controversy generated by the Griswold decision, and the lack of consensus regarding its significance. The difficulties of identifying the rights
at issue in Griswold must be recognized, if not resolved, before
those rights may be considered dispositive in the surrogacy
context.
Judge Sorkow's citation of Eisenstadt is similarly problematic:
"If the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. ' 61 The
56 381 U.S. 479 (Griswold, the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of

Connecticut, was arrested for giving medical advice regarding contraception to married
persons in violation of a state statute forbidding the use of contraceptive devices. The
Court held that the Connecticut law was an unconstitutional invasion of the parties'
privacy rights.).
" Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164.
58 Cf. Sutherland, supra note 12, at 285-88 (discussing the difficulties in identifying a
traditional "right of privacy" to justify the Griswold holding).
59 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
60Id. at 485. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg explicitly grounded the privacy
right in the Ninth Amendment:
I do agree that the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are
fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. My
conclusion that ... it embraces the right of marital privacy though that right is
not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution [footnote omitted] is supported both
by numerous decisions ... and by the language and history of the Ninth
Amendment.

Id. at 486-87.
61Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 385, 525 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at
453).
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privacy right in Eisenstadt,relied upon by the Court, may be of
dubious relevance in the surrogacy situation because of the ab62
sence of "privacy," as it is commonly understood, in the latter,
The surrogacy relationship in Baby M was a commercial transaction. The conception took place in a doctor's office. 63 The
relationship was solicited through a newspaper advertisement.
The parents had no sexual relations. These factors arguably destroy the "private" nature of the decision, undermining the
Court's reliance on Eisenstadtr4
66
In its consideration of Roe v. Wade, 65 and in In re Quinlan,
the trial court came closest to articulating a constitutional basis
for surrogacy: "If the law of our land sanctions a means to end
life, then that same law may be used to create and celebrate
life." 67 On its face, this somewhat grandiose statement is far from
compelling. First, the Roe Court expressly declined to authorize
the "end[ing of] life," explaining that it was beyond the purview
of the Court to determine when life began. 68 The Court further
sought to avoid bestowing such authority by restricting the right
to an abortion to the period before the fetus attains viability.
Major concerns of the court in establishing the "right to die" in
the Quinlan case, including concern about imposing criminal li-

Cf. Graham, supra note 11, at 316 (noting that the holding in Eisenstadt is arguably

6

inapplicable in the surrogacy context since surrogacy does not have the purpose of
"eradicating the effects of a system that uses women's childbearing ability to unfairly
subordinate them," unlike the use of contraceptives to avoid the "detriment of pregnancy"
in Eisenstadt).
61But cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973) (protection of
privacy rights with regard to matters of family "is not just concerned with a particular

place, but with a protected intimate relationship" which extends to the doctor's office);
Doe, 410 U.S. at 219 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The right of privacy has no more
conspicuous place than in the physician-patient relationship, unless it be in the priestpenitent relation.").
64See Note, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 107,

112 (1982) (principle of right to privacy only applies if surrogacy process is private rather
than public).
61410 U.S. 113.
- 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
67Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1164.
68

We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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ability for homicide or suicide, 69 are similarly inapposite in the
70
surrogacy context.
The common thread in these cases-the thread upon which a
constitutional defense of surrogacy must hang-is the notion of
a decisional right, which may be exercised negatively ("to end
life") or positively ("to create life"). 71 These rights, at least in
certain areas of personal choice, outweigh any countervailing
state interests. 72 As the Quinlan court explained: "Presumably
this [privacy] right is broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions." 73 That an individual has an affirmative right to make
these decisions in connection with her reproductive capacity,
however, is not the same as saying, as the trial court did, that
state interference is prohibited in private matters by virtue of a
vague privacy right.
The Supreme Court has held quite clearly that the state is not
so prohibited in Bowers v. Hardwick,74 the most recent Supreme
Court privacy case, conspicuous by its omission from the Baby M
decision. Respondent Hardwick challenged the constitutionality
of a Georgia statute criminalizing consentual sodomy. The Supreme Court forcefully rejected the argument that the line of
cases cited by Judge Sorkow conferred a broad right of privacy.
The Court took the opportunity to stress its reluctance to expand
the concept of fundamental rights:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in
69 Quinlan, 70

N.J. at 51-52, 355 A.2d at 669-70.

70See In re Farrell, 212 N.J. Super. 294, 303-02, 514 A.2d 1342, 1344-46 (Ch. Div.

1986) (identifying four state interests adverse to the "right-to-die": preserving life, pre-

venting suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession and protecting innocent third parties).
71 Baby

7

M, 217 N.J. Super. at 386, 525 A.2d at 1164.

See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 353-55, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225-26 (1985). See generally

Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handlingof Dying Patients,37 RUTGERS L. REv.

543 (1985); Gerety, supra note 38, at 236 (defining privacy as "an autonomy or control
over the intimacies of personal identity").
73 Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. Karen Quinlan's "putative decision" to end
her life is later characterized by the court as "a valuable incident of her right of privacy."
Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
7 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
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the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution. 75
It is difficult to argue that the procreational rights relied upon by
Judge Sorkow, without further clarification, do not require precisely such an "expansive view" in order to accommodate the
surrogacy relationship.
First, none of the cases relied upon by Judge Sorkow extends
an affirmative procreation right beyond the traditional family
unit. 76 There are no precedents suggesting that a procreation right
exists where there is an express intention, like that made by Mrs.
Whitehead, not to parent the child. Nor is there support for the
77
trial court's allusions to the "couple's" right to procreate.
Elizabeth Stem, though undoubtedly an interested party, was not
a party to the contract. The court ascribed a recondite "procreation" right to Dr. Stern which the case law does not support.
Second, surrogacy is distinguishable from the foregoing cases
because it does not involve sexual intercourse. There is no invasion of "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" decried by
the Griswold Court. 78 Judge Sorkow extracted principles from
the above cases that do not necessarily support surrogacy. They
are too general and unfocused. Indeed, under Judge Sorkow's
analysis, it may be argued that almost any activity resulting in
"procreation" would be constitutionally protected.
Finally, even if the procreation rights outlined by Judge Sorkow
were sufficient to assure both parties the right to engender a
child, those rights have little if any bearing on the custody of
such child. The court erroneously confused the procreation right
to beget a child with the natural parents' liberty interest in their
- Id. at 2846.
76 See

Graham, supra note 11, at 310 (noting that Griswold and Skinner protect only
family rights).
7' Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 387, 525 A.2d at 1165. See Brief of Concerned United

Birthparents, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 25, In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d
1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), rev'd,No. A-39 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988) [hereinafterBirthparents'Amicus
Brie]] (The brief argues that, "Elizabeth Stern is not procreating at all. Rather, she is
attempting to acquire a biologically unrelated child through adoption.").
78Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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child. 79 Because he neglected to identify the latter, the Judge

never grappled with the issue of its alienability. 80 The rights outlined by Judge Sorkow are simply insufficient to sustain the sur-

rogacy agreement, which requires not only the engendering of a
child, but the subsequent surrender of that child, as well. The
degree to which the right-to enter into a surrogacy relationship
may be considered a "procreation" right raises serious problems
which the Baby M decision does not resolve.

II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH-THE DECISIONAL
RIGHT, THE RIGHT OF BODILY INTEGRITY, AND THE
LIBERTY INTEREST

A. A Revised Formulation
The constitutionality of the surrogacy process may be defended
more persuasively by focusing on the parties' decisional rights,
their rights to bodily integrity, and the development of their liberty interests in their child. 8 1 The notion of a fundamental "decisional" privacy right was first made explicit in the abortion
cases.8 2 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court stated that the right
79For fuller discussion of liberty interest, see infra note 93 and accompanying text, and
text accompanying notes 135-148. Cf. Robertson, supra note 55, at 986 (noting that the
Supreme Court has "not distinguished carefully between conceiving and rearing a child").
10See Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. Rnv. 478, 484 n.36
(1984) ("[C]ourts have properly held that assertion of one right does not constitute waiver
of another, even though actions inconsistent with the exercise of the first right may be
necessary in order to exercise the second.... Assertion of the first right may constitute
a decision, but because of the substantive policy that separate rights may be separately
asserted, it is not deemed a decision taken with respect to the second right.").
81The term "decisional rights" as used in this paper refers only to a person's right to
make decisions regarding her own reproductive capacity; that is, decisions with respect
to conception, gestation, abortion or birth, and the surrender of her child. The right to
bodily inteirity includes the right to control one's own body as well as the right to be
free from bodily invasions imposed by others. Both facets of the right to bodily integrity
are implicated in the surrogacy situation.
12See Note, Roe v. Wade and In re Quinlan: Individual Decision and the Scope of
Privacy's Constitutional Guarantee, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 111, 121 n.71 (1977) (noting that
although Roe "was certainly not the first 'privacy' case to refer to individual decision
[and] the concern for 'freedom of choice' has been implicit in all the other 'privacy
cases', Roe is the first case, explicitly decided on the basis of the right of privacy, that
ties the right of privacy to freedom of individual decision").
As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850: "In construing
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of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. ' 83 As the Court noted
later in Carey v. PopulationServices International:
This right of personal privacy includes "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."
[sic] While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have
not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified
governmental interference are personal decisions "relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-84
ships, and child rearing and education." (citations omitted)
The surrogacy relationship involves precisely those decisions
regarding procreation, family relations, and child rearing discussed in Carey. Commentators have suggested that the decisional right is a privacy right which focuses "on broader aspects
of autonomy and is concerned with a more generalized ability of
individuals to determine for themselves whether to perform certain acts or to undergo certain experiences. '85 Others suggest that
the notion of a decisional right is supported by the precedents
established in cases such as Skinner and Griswold. "Taken together with Griswold which recognized as equally protected the
individual's decision not to bear a child, the meaning of Skinner
is that whether one person's body shall be the source of another
'86
life must be left to thatperson and that person alone to decide.
It is suggested here that the cases discussed above, support the
proposition that both potential biological parents have a fundamental right to be free from state interference in the exercise of
their decisional privacy rights to engender a child through
7
surrogacy.8
the right to privacy, the Court ... has recognized a privacy interest with reference to
certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make."
The doctrinal underpinnings of the "right to die" cases may aptly be characterized as
"decisional," also. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-42, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
13Roe,

410 U.S. at 153.

84Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85.
85Right of Privacy, supra note 12, at 1163.
86 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 1340 (emphasis
added).

"ISee generally Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 (The right of privacy extends to individual
decisions by nonmarried individuals to use contraceptives, for "[t]he decision whether or
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Both parties in the surrogacy context also have a fundamental
right to bodily integrity, at least for purposes of reproduction,

without state interference. Freedom from intrusion of the body
merits the same degree of constitutional protection, at minimum,
as freedom from intrusion of the home or the bedroom, which
has been well established. 88 Roe stressed that the woman is free
89
to control her own body, at least until fetal viability.
The Supreme Court has also held that the individual has the
right to be free from intrusive bodily invasions. 90 According to
Tribe, "the body constitutes the major locus of separation between the individual and the world and is in that sense the first
object of each person's freedom." 9' As another commentator
points out, "[a]ll of this comes in the end to a control over the
most basic vehicle of selfhood: the body. For control over the
body is the first form of autonomy and the necessary condition,
92
for those who are not saints or stoics, of all later forms.
Finally, the nature of the parents' interest in the child conceived, carried and born pursuant to the terms of the surrogacy
not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices."); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (dictum, Brennan, J.)("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42. See also
Graham, supra note 11, at 317 (discussing decisional rights).
Is See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515-22, 539-55 (1961) (Douglas, J. and Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Stanley, 394 U.S. 557.
89410 U.S. 113. See also infra note 122; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221 (The
court held that bodily control has been "long recognized" by the law. "[Glenerally, a
competent informed patient's interest in freedom from nonconsensual invasion of her
bodily integrity would outweigh any state interest."); Gallagher, PrenatalInvasions &
Interventions:What's Wrong with FetalRights?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 18-21 (1987).
90See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (pumping of defendant's stomach

to obtain evidence of morphine use "shocked the conscience" and therefore, was prohibited by the due process clause). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, supra note 13, at 1329-37. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking
of a blood sample from a drunk driving suspect did not violate the Fourth Amendment);
Comment, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily Intrusions, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 130
(1984) (discussing the circumstances under which an invasive procedure may be permitted
under the Fourth Amendment in procuring evidence for use in a criminal proceeding).
The Fourth Amendment cases allowing intrusion are distinguishable in that the state
interest in regulating surrogacy, if any, is presumably less compelling than the state's
interest in prosecuting criminal suspects.
91L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 1330. Professor Tribe
notes, however, that not all forms of intrusion or unwanted touching can be considered
"violations of the self," e.g., police officer who gently pushes people back in order to
allow an ambulance to pass. Id. at 1330.
92Gerety, supra note 38, at 266 & n.119. See generally Radin, supra note 5, at 1880
(discussing the nature of bodily integrity, using a personhood analysis).
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agreement will be considered. The Supreme Court has discussed
this liberty interest in several cases, 93 making it clear that a
parents' interest in their child vests not merely as a result of a
biological tie but through the parents' voluntary cultivation of a
relationship with that child. It is argued here that the surrogate
mother cannot voluntarily "cultivate" such a relationship, within
the court's meaning, if it has already been legally repudiated, as
required by the surrogacy agreement.

B. The Revised FormulationApplied
This section will examine the decisional and bodily integrity
rights as they arise during the first three stages of the surrogacy
process: (1) the agreement; (2) insemination and (3) pregnancy.
These fundamental rights as well as the liberty interest that arises
will then be addressed in the context of the fourth stage of the
process, the determination of parental rights.
The key issue is whether rights exercised at the agreement
stage should control subsequent rights. Whether or not one party
may constitutionally obtain specific performance if the other
changes her mind (as in Baby M) hinges on the alienability of the
rights and interests involved at each stage of the surrogacy
arrangement.
The law generally "prohibits alienation and destruction of rights
to freedom from physical invasions of our bodies. ' 94 A boxer, for
example, may waive 95 his right to be free from bodily invasion
on a fight by fight basis, i.e., he can contemporaneously consent
91See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981) (noting "this Court's historical
recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
94InalienableRights, supra note 16, at 1941 n.30. The constitutional magnitude of this
rule is demonstrated by the burden which must be met by the party seeking such invasion
before it is permitted. See generally Comment, Lee v. Winston: Court Ordered Surgery
and the FourthAmendment-A New Analysis of Reasonableness?, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 149 (1984).
-9Waiver has been defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See generally
Simon, Rescinding a Waiver of a ConstitutionalRights, 68 GEO. L.J. 919 (1980) (dis-

cussing rescission of waivers in the criminal context).
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to battery. 96 The boxer, however, cannot transfer his right to be
free from bodily invasion to another 97person who would then be
empowered to make those decisions.
A crucial underlying notion here is that the boxer may legitimately change his mind about the value of his rights after he has
been knocked out a few times. The right to decide whether to
waive his right to be free from bodily invasion, must be equally
available to the "new" self that may emerge as a result of the
initial exercise of that right. It is argued in this article that the
same principle is applicable in the surrogacy context where certain decisional privacy rights and bodily integrity rights are
involved.
The proposition here is that it would violate the essence of the
decisional and bodily integrity rights to enforce the provisions of
a surrogacy contract against a decision-maker who changes her
mind through the subsequent exercise of the very same rights. A
bar on specific performance, therefore, preserves rather than
diminishes these rights.
As explained below there is an equally compelling argument
against the alienation of the surrogate's liberty interest in her
child because of the nature of that liberty interest. Since the
interest does not attach unless-and until-the parent has cultivated a relationship with the child, it will be argued that the
course of conduct necessary to vest the interest precludes its
alienation. The surrogate cannot cultivate such a relationship if
she has alienated her interest.
1. The Agreement
It is not at all clear, as the trial court asserted, that the parties
have a constitutionally protected right to enter into the contract,
or that the "surrogate ...

[had such a right] to perform services"

pursuant to its terms. 98 There is no affirmative constitutional right
to enter into a contract. The Contract Clause protects against the
9 See McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922) (boxing match as an
agreement or consent to suffer battery).
97InalienableRights, supra note 16, at 1941 n.30.

9Baby M,

217 N.J. Super. at 387-88, 525 A.2d at 1165.
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impairment of the obligations of contracts; it does not guarantee
a right to enter into them. 99
The court's reliance on Lochner v. New York'00 was misplaced. 10l In this case, the Supreme Court struck down restrictive
wage and hour legislation, holding it an unconstitutional interference with the parties' right to contract. That case has long been
repudiated as the prime example of the discredited economic
substantive due process approach, used by the Court to substitute
its own view for that of the legislature. 10 2
The constitutional protections to which the parties to a surrogacy agreement are entitled are not triggered because the parties
entered into a contract; they are triggered because that contract
involved fundamental rights. If the parties may constitutionally
engage in the surrogacy process, the only constitutional impediment that arises stems from the difference between acting and
agreeing to act. The difference is the period of time which may
lapse between making the decision and acting on it. Where a very
short period of time passes between the decision and the act, the
decision may be considered contemporaneous with the action. It
may be useful to think of the decision and the resultant act as
merged under such circumstances.
As the period of time increases, the decisionmaker becomes
increasingly detached from the act. A surrogate may agree to
become artificially inseminated a month from the date of the
agreement, for example. If she does not change her mind, she
confirms that original agreement through the contemporaneous
exercise of her decisional right at the time of the actual insemi99But cf. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten:The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235, 253 (1965) ("The point is

made that, since liberty of contract is not mentioned in the Constitution, it should not be
a constitutionally protected right. Yet, since the body of the Constitution protects against
the impairment of the obligations of contracts, it does not require a far-fetched application
of the emanations-and-penumbra theory to suggest that implicit in the contracts clause
(or at least radiating from it) is a constitutional right to enter into contracts.").
,0198-U.S. 45 (1905).
lo0, See H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 607 (1983) ("Though
Lochner's reputation lived on as a classic period piece in the history of the Court's
jurisprudence, its constitutional effect was fleeting... The [Bunting v. Ore., 243 U.S.
426 (1917)] decision was significant principally because it accomplished the de facto
overturning of Lochner.").
102See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes' famous dissent); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAV 343-50 (1986) (discussion of Lochner
andsubstantive due process from 1900 through 1936).
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nation. If she does change her mind, she has, by definition, done
so through the exercise of a decisional right no less valid than
her fifft exercise of that right and no less entitled to constitutional
protection. Similarly, a surrogate cannot irrevocably waive her
right to an abortion, although she may decline to exercise it. If a
surrogate does not have an abortion by the time the pregnancy
has progressed to the stage specified in Roe, the waiver may
become conclusive.
The more opportunities given to the decisionmaker to exercise
the right, the greater the experience and information available to
her each time she does so. The notion of maximizing the decisional right in this fashion finds support in Roe.10 3 The Court
explicitly elaborates on the broad range of physical, social, and
psychological considerations that the woman's decision will take
into account, and makes clear its expectation that such decisions
require the fullest possible understanding of the situation. Alienation of the decisional right denies the decisionmaker the benefit
of all reflection and experience acquired after she enters into the
agreement, 104
The Carey Court lends support to the notion of maximizing
decisional rights. Noting that a "less rigorous" test is applied to
restrictions on the rights of minors than the compelling state
interest test applicable when the privacy rights of adults are in
issue, the Court explains: "IT]he right of privacy implicated here
is the 'interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions 0 and the law has generally regarded minors
' 06
as having a lesser capability for making important decisions.
The Carey Court recognized the very limited circumstances under
which dimunition of the decisional right may be appropriate; that
is, where the decisionmaker is less capable.
The inability to alienate fundamental rights at the outset should
not preclude the parties from entering into a surrogacy relationM410 U.S. at 153.
supra note 80, at 537 (There needs to be "an irreducible minimum of
legal protection in every waiver situation, a requirement that follows directly from the
notion that the right inheres in the relationship between the parties. Because the right is
an essential part of the relationship, it can only be altered in form, but not totally
eliminated. Irk other words, the rights being waived are structuring devices; they can be
relinquished only if acceptable alternative means of structuring the relationship are
employed.").
15Carey, 431 U.S, at 693 n.15 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 529, 599-600 (1977)).
106Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 n.15.
104Cf.Rubin,
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ship in which they express a present intent to proceed with the
insemination, pregnancy, and surrender of the child as set forth
in their agreement. This prohibition on alienation, however, bars
specific performance as a remedy. Although this results in an
agreement of diminished enforceability, it does not rule out agreement.10 7 In effect, this limits the exercise of the decisional right
at the agreement stage only insofar as it would otherwise preclude
the exercise of that right at a subsequent stage. This maximizes
the individual's opportunity to exercise the right and enhances
the qiality of decisionmaking at every stage.
2. Insemination and Conception
It is suggested in this section, that neither party to a surrogacy
contract may alienate his or her right to decide whether to utilize
artificial insemination. Judge Sorkow did not address the issue in
these terms, but held that until conception, breach by Mrs. Whitehead could not have been specifically enforced: "[T]he surrogate
may nonetheless renounce and terminate the contract until the
time of conception. She may be subject then for such monetary
damages as may be proven."' 08 Although Judge Sorkow rejected
specific performance at the pre-conception stage, there is no
explanation for his intuitive refusal to do so. The court did not
even speculate as to whether it could order specific performance
in the event of a similar breach, or change of mind, by Mr. Stern.
There are at least three justifications for the proposition that a
subsequent revocation of one's consent to be artificially inseminated is constitutionally protected. First, the frequently made
suggestion that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against
enslavement bars specific enforcement of a surrogacy contract is
107In the event of breach, the remedy could be limited to damages, as it generally is in
personal services contracts. But see Kronman, supra note 15, at 780 (suggesting that an
interest in the preservation of the promisor's integrity or self-respect underlies the prohibition against permitting a promisor from contracting away the right to "depersonalize"
his relationship with the other party by substituting damages for promised performance).

In the alternative, specific performance could be permitted only if the breach were not

attributable to the subsequent exercise of a decisional right, such as the loss of decisional
capacity of one of the parties (by reason of a coma, for example) or an attempt by the
father, while consistently indicating a willingness to rear the child, to extort support from
the surrogate.
10 Baby

M, 217 N.J. Super. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159. See also supra note 107.
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applicable at this stage as well as at the other stages of the
surrogacy process. 09
Second, the court's refusal to specifically enforce the agreement at this point is consistent with, and perhaps implicitly recognizes, the inalienability of the bodily integrity rights of both
parties.110 Artificial insemination involves a far more invasive
(albeit less painful) bodily intrusion for the woman than the blows
exchanged between boxers. The surrogate, like the boxer, may
not irrevocably transfer her right to bodily integrity.
Similiarly, under the analysis proposed above, to compel specific performance on the part of the man would constitute an
impermissible bodily intrusion."' Waiver of the right to be free
of such intrusion cannot be valid if it is revoked prior to the
commission of the act waived. To do so would require an act of
112
physical force repugnant to our constitutional scheme.
Third, both parties have important decisional rights in this
context. A waiver may be understood as a negative exercise of
a decisional right. The question then becomes under what circumstances such a negative exercise becomes irrevocable. As
Judge Sorkow held, waiver of one's right to participate in artificial
113
insemination can never be irrevocable, nor may it be enforced.
The decisional right of each party with respect to his or her
reproductive capacity is such an important and personal matter
that, where it has addressed the issue, the Supreme Court has
forbidden its delegation 1 4 and protected it from encroachment by
the state.115 In doing so, the Court has effectively proscribed the
109See Surrogate Mother Agreements, supra note 11, at 470. Cf. Kronman,.supranote
15, at 778-79 (The author explains that every contract creates an enforceable obligation

to perform or pay damages, and argues that it is not the nature of the services to be
performed that makes an employment contract self-enslaving. Rather, the distinguishing
mark of such a contract is that it attempts to deprive the promisor of the option of
substituting money damages for specific performance.). See infra note 131.
110Cf. Inalienable Rights, supra note 16, at 1941-49 (rejecting the traditional justifications for the inalienability of rights in this context as paternalistic and inappropriate, and
suggesting a theory of "personhood" as an alternative).
I See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
"3 Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159.
114 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) ("Clearly since the State
cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage... the State cannot delegate
authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same
period.").
11s See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (noting that the woman's decisional right is protected;
however, this right to make decisions regarding reproduction is not "unqualified").
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removal of a decisional right from its holder's contemporaneous
control. As the parties make various decisions regarding reproduction and use of their bodies during the surrogacy process,
they acquire new information and perspectives. Through such
continued decisionmaking the parties not only express themselves, they define themselves. It may be argued that a self
denied
6
this capacity is severely, and intolerably, diminished. "
3. Pregnancy and Abortion
Just as Judge Sorkow rejected specific performance in the preconception breach situation, he also struck the provision in the
contract prohibiting abortion even though, like pre-conception
breach, it was not at issue in the Baby M case:
After conception, only the surrogate shall have the right, to
the exclusion of the sperm donor, to decide whether to abort
the fetus. Her decision to abort must comply with the guidelines set forth in Roe v. Wade [citation omitted].... [O]nly
woman has the constitutionally protected right to determine
117
the manner in which her body and person shall be used.
This statement could not be a clearer recognition of the nondelegability of the woman's decisional privacy interest in the surrogacy context.
The Roe Court did not, however, address the alienability of
that decisional right, for the Court did not analyze the question
of whether a surrogate can be bound by her own prior agreement
See infra note 133.
217 N.J. Super. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159. Although the argument may be persuasive,
the court's reliance on Roe is misplaced in view of note 67 of that decision: "Neither in
this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton [citations omitted], do we discuss the father's rights, if
any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No paternal right has
been asserted in either of the cases .... "Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67. See infra note 118
(distinguishing nondelegability of the abortion right from inalienability). See generally
Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions:Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (1974) (discussing then-current status of issues left open
by Roe and Doe, including constitutionality of statutes requiring spousal or parental
consent). But cf. Graham, supra note 11, at 310-15 (suggesting that it is "an aspect of
motherhood" that underlies women's right to choose whether to bear the child or terminate the pregnancy). Under Professor Graham's analysis, it is questionable whether the
surrogate, who has presumptively renounced "motherhood" with respect to post-birth
parenting, retains her right to choose.
116
"7
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to abjure abortion. 118 It may be argued, nevertheless, that Roe
precluded such a result since the decision not to have an abortion
before pregnancy could only be theoretical. Roe recognized the

rights of a pregnant woman, not a woman contemplating pregnancy.1 1 9 By its emphasis on the woman's actual circumstances,

the Court firmly anchored the decisional right in a concrete,
practical context, rather than a speculative or abstract one.120 As
the Danforth Court observed: "The decision to abort, indeed, is
an important and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and
imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences.1121 It would be inconsistent with the principle of
maximizing decisional rights to give that right exclusively to the

surrogate's earlier self. That earlier self's waiver would be less
knowing and intelligent than that of her later, more experienced
self.

While Roe did not establish that a woman has complete control
over her own body for purposes of pregnancy, it suggested such
a right limited only by the conflicting rights of a viable fetus.122

I's See Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: InalienableRights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. Rav. 330, 333, 336-38 (1985) (developing the concept of "relational" as opposed to "individual" privacy rights and arguing
that "relational rights," including abortion and the right to be free from involuntary
servitude, are "necessarily inalienable" because the purpose of the right is to protect the
individual in her relations with others). Tribe argues that an individual's earlier choices
do not lessen the scope of her right: "Government must facilitate the right's exercise by
means within its constitutional power-so as to make its actual exercise possible notwithstanding any prior choices made by the right's holder-in order to ensure the continuing vitality of fundamental relational norms." Id. at 335.
But see InalienableRights, supra note 16, at 1940 (The author distinguishes defeasance,
i.e., revocation of a right by the government, delegability, i.e., transfer of a right by the
government, and alienability, voluntary transfer of a right by the holder of that right, in
the abortion context. It is then argued that although "Roe created an indefeasible right
to an abortion during the first trimester" and Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, made the right
nondelegable, neither precludes alienability of that right since that "assume[s] that private
control of the [abortion] right invites evils similar to those of government control and that
inalienability will not create evils of its own.").
119
Roe, 410 U.S. at 124 passim.
,20
Id. at 153.
121Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
122
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. But as Justice Blackmun notes, the right to privacy and the
"unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases" are not the same. Id. at 154. See
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 115 (R. Dworkin ed.
1977); Graham, supra note 11, at 313 (noting that in allowing women to abort during the
first trimester, the Court was, in part, recognizing women's "special interest" in pregnancy
due to its "physical impact upon her"). Cf. Right of Privacy, supra note 12, at 1172 n.59
("The Court's emphasis on viability as the critical element in this decision seems to make
the law of abortion dependent on the state of medical technology."). See generally Note,
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Even if the biological father's decisional rights at this stage were
equal to those of the biological mother, the surrogate mother's
combined decisional and bodily integrity rights would nonetheless
outweigh the rights of the father.'2 The conflicting rights of a
potential father are simply not of the same magnitude, mainly for
the simple reason that he is not pregnant and his physical health
is not at stake.1 24 In the absence of such conflicting rights, the
125
woman's pregnancy is not generally subject to state control.
Thus, she could not be ordered to continue the pregnancy prior
to fetal viability. Nor could she be ordered to abort a "defective"
fetus or undergo any other type of medical treatment related to
26
her pregnancy or to the birth of the child. 1
In addition, a waiver cannot be used to achieve a result which
could not be ordered by a court.127 Because a court could not
prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion within the limits of
Roe, pre-conception alienation may not be used to prevent a
surrogate from having an abortion.
4. Determination of Parental Rights
Judge Sorkow predicated his enforcement of the provision in
the surrogacy agreement requiring termination of parental rights
on his conclusion that the contract was "constitutionally protected."'12 The threshold question to be addressed is the meaning
of such "protected" status in the surrogacy context. Even if the
Medical Responsibilityfor FetalSurvival Under Roe and Doe, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv.444 (1975) [hereinafter Medical Responsibilityfor Fetal Survival].
'2 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67-72. Since the marriage contract bestows no greater rights
on the father, it would be difficult to argue that the surrogacy contract can do so. One
might question whether this could be challenged if the latter contract is structured so as
to impose significantly greater obligations on the father.

124See generally L.
115There may be a

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 1340.

trend toward subjecting pregnant women to some degree of state
control even prior to the point at which the fetus becomes viable, and even where abortion
is not sought. ABA Reveals Mounting Rights TransgressionsAgainst Pregnant Women,
Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 8, 1987, at 7, col. 1.

126See Andrews, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that women should have control over their
bodies including the ability of the surrogate mother to "engage in whatever activities she
wishes, to refuse any medical consultations or treatments and to abort or not abort based
on her own decisions"). See also Medical Responsibilityfor FetalSurvival, supra note
122, at 447 (discussing woman's interest in her own health, distinct from, although
"[cilosely allied to the privacy interest").
127See

Rubin, supra note 80, at 539.

128Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1166.
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parties have a constitutional right to enter into performance contracts in general, such a right will not be found where it conflicts
with other constitutional rights-voting rights, for example. 129
There are similar problems with according protected status to the
provision of the Baby M contract regarding termination of parental rights, 130 insofar as it requires the unconstitutional alienation
of fundamental rights and the surrogate's liberty interest in her
child.
First, specific performance of the provision requiring the surrogate to terminate her parental rights again raises Thirteenth
Amendment issues. It has been argued that it would violate the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against forced servitude to
order the surrogate to surrender the child and to jail her for
3
contempt if she refuses.' '
Second, the surrogate exercises both her right to control her
own body and her decisional right to carry and bear a child when
she chooses to become and remain pregnant. Focusing on her
right of bodily integrity, she should not be put in a position where
abortion is her only legal alternative to surrendering the child. 132
Moreover, if pregnancy is viewed as the ongoing exercise of a
decisional right, it may well lead to the development of a new
self with new values. The self who has undergone pregnancy and
birth may legitimately place a different value on her parental
rights than the self who has not. For the latter the alienation of
her parental rights at the agreement stage is an abstraction-at
least with respect to this particular pregancy, birth, and child. 33
I2
0

13

See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 936.
The trial court held that "in the absence of a public policy regarding surrogacy in

New Jersey ... the laws of adoption, custody and parental termination were never
intended to apply and do not apply to surrogacy. . . ." 217 N.J. Super. at 390, 525 A.2d
at 1167. While the distinction made by the court may be appropriate for purposes of

interpreting state statutes, such a distinction cannot justify the denial of well-established
constitutional rights otherwise available to the parties in the adoption, custody, and
parental termination contexts.
131See Surrogate MotherAgreements, supra note 11, at 470. But see InalienableRights,
supra note 16, at 1938 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit"... several
family arrangements that bear a striking similarity to slavery").
132
The Baby M case presented an equally desperate (or manipulative, depending on

one's point of view) mother. Mrs. Whitehead threatened, during a tape recorded conversation, to kill herself and the baby. Court Hears Suicide Tape of Surrogate Mother, StarLedger (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 1.

133
See Radin, supra note 5, at 1904 ("The identity aspect of personhood focuses on the
integrity and continuity of the self required for individuation. In order to have a unique
individual identity, we must have selves that are integrated and continuous over time.").
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The pre-birth decision to surrender the child is too attenuated
from the actual surrender of the child to constitute a valid
waiver.1 34 Consequently, the court cannot specifically enforce a
contractual provision in which the surrogate mother alienates her
decisional right with respect to her child.
In its adoption statutes, the state has determined the point at
which surrender becomes irrevocable, presumably taking into
account the interests of the child and the adoptive parents. If the
surrogate does not change her mind, she confirms her initial
decision to surrender the child through the contemporaneous
exercise of her decisional right at that point. The surrender is
valid under the adoption statutes, as well as under a decisional
analysis.
Third, the unique nature of the right, that is the natural mother's liberty interest in her child, precludes its alienation. The
Supreme Court has examined this liberty interest in four
cases: Stanley v. Illinois,135 Quilloin v. Walcott,136 Caban v.
Mohammed, 37 and Lehr v. Robertson. 38 These cases have made
it quite clear that an unwed biological father must take affirmative
steps to secure his liberty interest in his child. 139 Such affirmative
steps are similiarly required of the biological mother.
In Lehr, the denial of a putative father's petition to vacate or
set aside an order of adoption was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The Court found that the father had never established a
substantial relationship with his biological child, and therefore,
See also Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 ("We protect the decision whether to have a child
because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's self-definition .... ); Surrogate
Mothers Vent Feelings of Doubt and Joy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1987, at B4, col. 5.
134Cf. Rubin, supra note 80, at 484 (arguing that waiver can only result from a decision
directly related to the right in question).
135405 U.S. 645.
136434 U.S. 246.
137 441 U.S. 380.
138463 U.S. 248, 258-63. The Lehr Court succinctly analyzed Stanley, Quilloin, and
Caban. The Court cites these cases for their discussion of the development of the liberty
interest. For the Court's approach to termination of a liberty interest, see Santosky, 455
U.S. 745. See generally Raab, Lehr v. Robertson: Unwed Fathersand Adoption-How

Much Process Is Due?, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 265, 285 (1984) (suggesting that the Lehr
Court's holding that due process was not required to terminate the unwed father's parental
rights demonstrates "an unfounded preference for the nuclear family"),
139A married biological father assumes responsibility for the child as a matter of law,
The law does not extend this right to non-biological adoptive parents who are anticipating
and planning for the birth of the prospective child. The adoptive parents, as a matter of
law, cannot develop a liberty interest in the child until the adoption takes place.
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had no liberty interest in that child entitled to constitutional
protection. 140 As Justice Stewart noted in his dissent in Caban,1 41cited with approval by the majority in Lehr: "Parental
rights do not spring forth full blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring." 142
The very next sentence of Justice Stewart's dissent, irrelevant
in Lehr but crucial here, discusses the interests of the biological
mother in her child: "The mother carries and bears the child, and
in this sense her parental relationship is clear."'1 43 It is implicit in
Stewart's dissent that the biological mother's assumption of responsibility for the child must be as voluntary and deliberate as
that of the father. The decision in Cabansupports the proposition
that the same standard should be applied in determining parental
liberty interests of men and women. 144 The surrogate assumes
responsibilities which give her a liberty interest in the newborn
child by choosing to carry the fetus to term and giving birth, just
as the biological father must choose to cultivate a relationship
with the child in order to acquire such an interest.145 As the Lehr
Court noted, "[T]he rights of the parents are a counterpart of the
1 46
responsibilities they have assumed.'
The surrogate's voluntary assumption of such responsibility
begins with her exercise of her decisional right to conceive the
child and the continuance of the pregnancy represents an ongoing
affirmation of that decision. Carrying and bearing the child are
tantamount to the "accept[ance] of some measure of responsibility for the child's future,"'147 which an unwed biological father
must show in order to establish a liberty interest.
The fact that the liberty interest cannot vest until its subjecta child rather than a fetus-exists does not in itself preclude
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.

140

141Caban, 441 U.S. at 397.
142Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260.

Caban, 441 U.S. at 397.

143

I" See Caban, 441 U.S. at 388-89.

See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260.
Id. at 257.
47Id. at 262. Indeed, some authors argue that pregnancy itself should be considered a
"significant" parent-child relationship. See Chavkin, Third Party Reproduction: Dissenting Voices & Questions, a paper presented at a Forum on Reproductive Laws for the
1990s, in New York City (May 4, 1987), at 2-3 (on file at the Harvard Women's Law
Journal).
14.
146
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alienation of that interest. Future property rights may be freely
assigned, for example. The difference is that in this context the
course of conduct which must be followed in order for the liberty
interest to vest, that is, the cultivation of a parent/child relationship, cannot be reconciled with the alienation of that liberty
interest.
If the surrogate decides to abide by the terms of the agreement,
and confirms her intention to relinquish the child after its birth,
there is no problem. The liberty interest vests and she is free to
relinquish it. But if she changes her mind during the pregnancy,
birth, or at any time prior to the valid surrender of that liberty
interest and is compelled against her will, to proceed with the
terms of the agreement, her assumption of responsibility cannot
be considered voluntary. The volitional element essential to the
creation of the liberty interest is destroyed and the interest does
not vest. 148 Thus, the alienation of the surrogate's liberty interest
is inconsistent with the nature of that interest.
The foregoing analysis is consistent with state adoption statutes
which uniformly prohibit irrevocable pre-birth consent to adoption by the biological mother. 149 Although the mother may decide
to surrender her child before birth, and may discuss arrangements
for doing so with an agency or prospective adoptive parents, as
a matter of law she cannot be held to any agreement to surrender
the child entered into prior to that child's birth. This is usually
justified by referring to the great stress to which the biological
'4 This is consistent with the doctrinal uncertainty regarding the biological mother's
rights, if any, with respect to an aborted but viable fetus. At the very least, under this
liberty interest analysis, pregnancy could be construed as conduct inconsistent with the
alienation of that interest.

Under substantive due process analysis, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNO,

supra note 102, at 416-19, legislation restricting the decisional and bodily integrity rights
of the parties is subject to the two-tiered Carey test. See also supra note 19. However,
it is not absolutely clear whether the decision to surrender custody of one's child would
trigger the same standard. The question is whether the decision to relinquish one's child
could be considered a decision regarding child rearing, and thus a fundamental right under
Carey, or the surrender of a lesser right, a "liberty interest" under the analysis of Lehr,
and therefore subject to a less stringent standard.
149See e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1511 (Smith-Hurd 1987) ("Any consent or
surrender ... which is not revoked within 72 hours after the birth of the child is irrevocable ....

Id. at § 1511, paragraph D (emphasis added)); N.Y. DOM.

REL. LAW

§ 111

(McKinney 1988) (which describes required consents for the adoption of a child, interpreted by the courts as invalidating pre-birth consents to adoption, see Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 108 Misc. 2d 1098, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1981) (holding that § Ill does not
apply to consents given before birth, and such consents are void ab initio)).
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mother is subject during the pregnancy, which precludes a valid
surrender. The superficial paternalistic appeal of this argument

cannot account for the universality of the rule it purports to
explain. 150 The proposition here is that the fundamental contradiction described above, between the voluntary assumption of
responsibility by the biological mother which leads to the vesting

of a liberty interest and the coerced assumption of responsibility,
which could result from the alienation of that interest, better
explains the aspect of the adoption statutes.
If Mrs. Whitehead's liberty interest and decisional rights could
not be alienated,' 5 ' the absence of a voluntary surrender of that
right at the time of Baby M's birth precluded the termination of
her parental rights without due process. 152 The process due Mrs.
Whitehead in this situation should not have been any less than
that afforded parents who have had a change of heart after agreeing to surrender the child, or who have abused or neglected their
children. 53 Nor should it have been any greater. It would have
been appropriate for the court to have considered Mrs. White-

1'o Cf. Coleman, supra note 5, at 97 (arguing that pre-birth consent by the surrogate
should be irrevocable since the policy considerations against enforcing such consents in
the adoption context, such as the concern that the consent is a result of emotional distress
or societal pressure, are not present in the surrogacy situation). Coleman seems to address
the voluntariness of the consent and assumes that duress is so inherent in the adoption
situation that a consent is presumptively invalid. Yet, one might argue that such duress
is not necessarily alleviated after the birth. All that has really changed is (1) the woman
subject to the duress has experienced the preguancy and birth and (2) her body is no
longer necessary to sustain the child's life.
151Cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 4, at 935, 942-49 (suggesting that this right is
"modified inalienable"; babies cannot be sold but they may be given away). The law
recognizes the need for this option, but retains a strong interest in controlling the terms
of its exercise. Again, it may be conceptually useful to think of surrender as a negative
exercise of the decisional right.
152See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced
with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs."). See
generally, Boskey & McCue, Alternative Standardsfor the Termination of Parental
Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. Rav. 1, 4 (1978) (comparing the "extraordinary judicial remedy"
of termination of parental rights characterized by a "permanent and irreversible nature"
with the far less portentious custody order, which does not preclude the parent denied
custody from subsequently regaining it).
"5 See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (holding that to terminate parental rights constitutionally,
the state must prove its allegations by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than by a
lesser "preponderance of the evidence" standard).
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head's original agreement to surrender the child, 5 4 her conduct
throughout her pregnancy, 155 and her initial voluntary release of
156
the infant to the Sterns.
Absent a valid surrender, parental rights cannot be constitutionally terminated unless there are findings justifying such termination under the applicable statute. 57 The state's interest in
the child should be limited to its traditional parens patriae concern for that child's welfare. 58 Accordingly, if there are no findings justifying termination, the court must determine the custody
and visitation arrangements which would be in the child's best
interest, consistent with the liberty interests of both biological
parents in their child. 159

CONCLUSION
Surrogacy contracts are constitutional. Indeed, as Judge Sorkow correctly noted, barring them may be unconstitutional. Sur14 Baby

M, 217 N.J. Super. at 344, 525 A.2d at 1142-43.
-- Id. at 347, 525 A.2d at 1144.
156 Id.

I" Although the Court held that the due process requirements of Stanley, 405 U.S. 645,
and Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, were satisfied by the "notice to the defendants, [and] their
appearance and active participation in the trial itself," 217 N.J. Super. at 399, 525 A.2d
at 1171, the standard imposed on Whitehead during that trial was without precedent in
termination proceedings. While parental fitness is the standard typically imposed, Mrs.
Whitehead's parental rights were effectively terminated by utilization of the "best interests
of the child" criteria usually employed in custody determinations. In effect, the trial court
treated Mrs. Whitehead's agreement to terminate her rights as the basis for a rebuttable
presumption of unfitness and required her to show that it would be in the child's best
interest for her to have custody. Cf. Comment, Washington County Dep't of Social Serv.
v. Clark: The Constitutionality of a Rebuttable Presumption in a ParentalRights Termination Case, 43 MD. L. REv. 632, 633-34, 643-44, 646 (1984) (analyzing the decision
of the Maryland Court of Appeals striking as unconstitutional a statutory rebuttable
presumption that the best interests of a child in continuous foster care for more than two
years would be served by the termination of parental rights).
158The oft-cited prohibitions against baby-selling are not disputed here. It is assumed
for purposes of this article that Mrs. Whitehead was being paid for services rendered,
and that notwithstanding contractual provisions to the contrary, she would have been
entitled to pro rata payment for such services on a quantum meruit theory at whatever
point, and for whatever reason-including abortion-the pregnancy terminated. Such an
approach may deter the hiring of surrogates, but that is not the concern here.
159In New Jersey, for example, the biological mother and biological father have equal
claims in a custody dispute, subject to the court's determination as to the arrangement
which would be in the best interest of the child. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4.
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rogacy, however, is not a single event. It is a relationship which
changes over time, composed of four distinct stages: agreement,
insemination and conception, pregnancy and abortion, and determination of parental rights. Rejecting Judge Sorkow's formulation of a single "procreation right" broad enough to encompass
all aspects of surrogacy, and perhaps any form of procreation,
this article focuses on two other manifestations of the fundamental privacy right-the parties' bodily integrity and decisional
rights-as well as on the parents' liberty interest in their child.
While both parties have the right to indicate a present intent
to comply with the terms of the surrogacy agreement, and to
affirm their decisions at each stage, neither party can constitutionally attain specific performance where the other's fundamental bodily integrity or decisional rights are involved. To do so
would destroy the parties' ability to fully exercise these fundamental rights.
Accordingly, neither party to the surrogacy contract may be
compelled to participate in any of the stages of surrogacy involuntarily. This includes the right to refuse to participate in artificial
insemination after signing a contract but before conception or,
for the woman, the decision whether or not to abort or otherwise
control the medical procedures to which she may be subjected
during pregnancy and birth.
Nor may decisional privacy rights be alienated, at least in the
surrogacy context. Decisions regarding reproductive choice are
too personal and important to be removed from the individual's
contemporaneous control. The parties acquire new information
and possibly new values during the course of the surrogacy process. The rights to make decisions about reproductive choice
available to the original self should be equally available to the
"new" self that may emerge as the result of the continued exercise
of those decisional rights. It would violate the surrogate's decisional and bodily integrity rights to forcibly remove the child
from her absent a valid, voluntary surrender. Moreover, the notion that the parties should have the fullest possible benefit of
their own experience and reflection in exercising their decisional
rights requires that they have the opportunity to exercise those
fights at each stage of the surrogacy process.
Finally, the surrogate's liberty interest in her biological child
cannot be alienated. An analysis of the parental liberty interest

52
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suggests that it vests as a result of the parent's assumption of
responsibility for the child, a course of behavior inconsistent with
the alienation of the surrogate's rights at this stage. If the surrogate does not freely confirm her original intention to relinquish
the child after the birth, her parental rights may not be terminated
without due process of law.

